
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), French existentialist philosopher.
Key passages from Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology
(L'Être et le Néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, 1943),
Part III, Chapter 1: "The Look" (Le Regard).
让-保罗·萨特(1905-1980),法国存在主义哲学家。
关键段落选自《存在与虚无:现象学本体论导论》(1943),
第三部分第一章:"注视"(Le Regard)。
Note: The following passages are paraphrased and quoted from Hazel Barnes' English translation
and published Chinese editions (陈宣良等译,三联书店2007年修订版).
Due to copyright, extended passages are presented as close paraphrase with key quotations marked.
Context: Sartre's most famous phenomenological description: the experience of being caught peeping through a keyhole.
I am bent over the keyhole, peering through it. I am absorbed in my act; I am my act. I am not "seen" — there is no consciousness of myself. I am wholly engaged, a pure consciousness directed outward. I am not for myself in this moment; I am my watching, my listening, my jealousy.
Then — footsteps in the hall. Someone is there. Someone has seen me.
Everything changes. I am suddenly seen. I feel the gaze of the Other upon me as a transformation of my entire being. I am no longer the pure subject who looks — I have become an object in the Other's world. I am caught. I am fixed. I am something.
"I see myself because somebody sees me."
Shame floods through me. Not shame before myself, but shame before the Other. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. Shame is the recognition that I am indeed the object that the Other sees and judges.
"Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me."
The Other's gaze does not merely add a property to my being — it constitutes a fundamental modification. Through the Look, I experience my own objectification. My transcendence — my freedom to be a subject making meaning of the world — is transcended by the Other's transcendence. I become a transcendence transcended.
"The essential consequence of our earlier observations is that, being-for-others, the being of the one who looks at me, I am possessed by the Other; the Other's look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculptures it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it."
我俯身在钥匙孔前,透过它窥视。我全神贯注于我的行为;我就是我的行为。我没有被"看见"——没有关于我自己的意识。我完全投入其中,一个纯粹的向外投射的意识。在这一刻,我不是为自己而存在;我就是我的注视、我的倾听、我的嫉妒。
然后——走廊里传来脚步声。有人在那里。有人看见了我。
一切都改变了。我突然被看见了。我感到他者的注视落在我身上,如同对我整个存在的转变。我不再是注视的纯粹主体——我已变成了他者世界中的一个对象。我被抓住了。我被固定了。我变成了某物。
"我看见自己,因为有人看见了我。"
羞耻涌遍全身。不是在自我面前的羞耻,而是在他者面前的羞耻。我为我在他者面前显现的样子感到羞耻。羞耻是这样一种认识:我确实是他者所看见和判断的那个对象。
"羞耻在本质上是认识。我认识到,我正如他者所看见我的那样。"
他者的注视不仅仅是给我的存在增加一个属性——它构成了一种根本性的修改。通过注视,我经历了自己的对象化。我的超越性——我作为赋予世界意义的自由主体——被他者的超越性所超越。我变成了一个被超越的超越。
"我们之前观察的一个基本结论是,作为为他者而存在的、注视着我看的人,我被他人所占有;他人的注视将我的身体塑造成它的赤裸状态,使之诞生,雕刻它,生产它如其所是的样子,看见它如我永远无法看见的那样。"
The Look is not primarily a perceptual event — it is an ontological one. It does not require eyes: a rustling of branches, the sound of footsteps, the movement of a curtain — anything can be the Look. What matters is the experience of being apprehended by another consciousness.
"The look is not a certain type of convergence of eyes upon me. It can be the rustling of branches, the sound of footsteps followed by silence, the slight opening of a window, the sudden stillness of a silhouette against the shutters."
Through the Look, three fundamental transformations occur:
1. I am fixed. The Other's gaze pins me down, gives me a nature — I am jealous, I am a voyeur, I am cowardly. This nature is not something I can freely choose or transcend from within; it is given to me from outside. My possibilities are drained away toward the Other.
"The Other's look confers on me a nature and a transcended transcendence. My possibilities are there, present, but dead — dead insofar as they are now dependent on a freedom that is not mine."
2. A new world appears. The world I organized around myself — with its distances, its meanings, its instrumental relations — is suddenly reorganized around the Other. Things that were oriented toward me now turn toward someone else. The world flows away from me.
"The world flows away from me toward the Other. The objects which I had disposed around me as instruments, which I had organized into a meaningful world — these same objects now have a dimension I cannot apprehend: they are also instruments for the Other."
3. I experience alienation. I discover that I am a stranger in a world that is not entirely mine. The Other has stolen my world — not physically, but phenomenologically. The meanings I had given things are now foreign to me because they are organized by another freedom.
"By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other."
注视主要不是一种知觉事件——它是一种本体论事件。它不需要眼睛:树枝的沙沙声、脚步声、窗帘的移动——任何东西都可以成为注视。重要的是被另一个意识所理解的经验。
"注视不是眼睛汇聚于我的某种类型。它可以是树枝的沙沙声,脚步声之后的寂静,窗户的微微打开,百叶窗上一个轮廓的突然静止。"
通过注视,三种根本性的转变发生了:
1. 我被固定了。 他者的注视将我钉住,赋予我一种本性——我是嫉妒的,我是偷窥者,我是怯懦的。这种本性不是我能够自由选择的;它是从外部赋予我的。我的可能性流失向他者。
2. 一个新世界的出现。 我围绕自己组织起来的世界——带着它的距离、它的意义、它的工具关系——突然围绕着他者重新组织。面向我的事物现在转向别人。世界从我这里流失。
3. 我经历了异化。 我发现自己是一个不完全属于自己的世界中的陌生人。他者偷走了我的世界——不是物理意义上的,而是现象学意义上的。我赋予事物的意义现在对我是陌生的,因为它们被另一种自由所组织。
"仅仅因为他者的出现,我就被置于对自己进行判断的位置——如同判断一个对象,因为我是作为对象出现在他者面前的。"
For Sartre, love is caught in an impossible dialectic. The lover wants to be loved freely — to be chosen as the absolute value of the Other's freedom. But this creates an insoluble paradox:
If the Other loves me freely, then their love is contingent — they could choose otherwise. I want their love to be necessary, absolute. But if I compel their love, then it is no longer free, and therefore no longer genuine love.
"The lover wants to be everything for the beloved — the entire world, a freedom that freely chooses him, and yet a freedom that is captured, that cannot choose otherwise."
Love attempts to resolve the conflict by capturing the Other's freedom from within: I want the Other to freely make me the center of their world, to choose me as their absolute value, while remaining free. But this project is doomed because freedom, once captured, ceases to be freedom.
Desire represents another attempt: in desire, I try to incarnate the Other — to reduce their transcending consciousness to mere flesh, to make their body present as pure facticity. But in doing so, I destroy the very freedom I sought to possess.
Masochism tries to resolve the conflict by becoming pure object for the Other — to annihilate one's own transcendence. But this fails because the masochist still experiences himself as an object, and thus still has consciousness of his own humiliation.
Sadism tries the opposite: to force the Other to be pure flesh, to compel their freedom to incarnate itself. But this also fails because the sadist can never truly reach the Other's freedom — they can only manipulate the body.
"Love, desire, hate, sadism, masochism — these are not psychological accidents but fundamental attitudes, each representing an attempt to resolve the insoluble conflict between consciousnesses. Each attempt is destined to fail because the Other's freedom and my freedom can never coexist peacefully. To be seen is to be wounded."
对萨特来说,爱情陷入了一个不可能的辩证法之中。爱人希望被自由地爱——被选择为他者自由的绝对价值。但这创造了一个不可解决的悖论:
如果他者自由地爱我,那么他们的爱就是偶然的——他们可以选择别的。我希望他们的爱是必然的、绝对的。但如果我强迫他们的爱,那它就不再是自由的,因此也就不再是真正的爱。
"爱人希望成为被爱者的一切——整个世界、一个自由选择他的自由、然而又是一个被捕获的、不能做其他选择的自由。"
爱情试图从内部捕获他者的自由来解决冲突:我希望他者自由地将我作为他们世界的中心,选择我作为他们的绝对价值,同时保持自由。但这个项目注定失败,因为自由一旦被捕获就不再是自由。
欲望代表了另一种尝试:在欲望中,我试图将他者肉身化——将他们超越的意识还原为纯粹的肉体,使他们的身体作为纯粹的事实性而呈现。但在这样做的过程中,我摧毁了我所寻求占有的那个自由本身。
"爱情、欲望、仇恨、施虐、受虐——这些不是心理上的偶然,而是根本性的态度,每一种都代表着一种解决意识之间不可调和之冲突的尝试。每一次尝试都注定失败,因为他者的自由和我的自由永远无法和平共存。被看见就是被伤害。"
The body occupies a crucial position in Sartre's analysis. My body is both the instrument through which I engage with the world and the surface upon which the Other's gaze inscribes my object-nature.
"The body is the denied transcendence that I am. It is at once the most intimate aspect of my being — that through which I touch, see, act — and the most alien: that which the Other sees and judges before I can even become aware of it."
In shame, I experience the paradox of the body: I am ashamed of my body (as the Other sees it), but I am ashamed in my body (as the medium through which shame is felt). The body is both subject and object, both who I am and what I appear to be.
"I make myself flesh in order to impel the Other to make herself flesh, and I impel her to make me flesh in order to make her discover her flesh."
身体在萨特的分析中占据着关键位置。我的身体既是我介入世界的工具,也是他者注视铭刻我的对象本性的表面。
"身体是我所否认的超越性。它同时是我存在中最亲密的方面——通过它我触摸、看、行动——也是最疏异的:在他者看见和判断它的时候,我甚至还没有意识到。"
在羞耻中,我经历了身体的悖论:我为我的身体(如他者所见)感到羞耻,但我在我的身体中(作为感受羞耻的媒介)感到羞耻。身体既是主体又是对象,既是我是谁又是我显现为什么。
| Concept / 概念 | Sartre's Formulation / 萨特的表述 |
|---|---|
| The Look (Le Regard) / 注视 | The fundamental experience of being apprehended by another consciousness / 被另一个意识所理解的基本经验 |
| Being-for-Others (Être-pour-autrui) / 为他存在 | The mode of being that constitutes my existence as an object for others / 构成我作为他者对象的存在方式 |
| Objectification / 对象化 | The Other's gaze transforms me from subject to object / 他者的注视将我从主体变为对象 |
| Shame (La Honte) / 羞耻 | The primordial recognition of being seen and judged / 被看见和被判断的原初认识 |
| Alienation / 异化 | The experience of losing my world to the Other / 我的世界被他者夺走的经验 |
| The Conflict / 冲突 | Between my freedom and the Other's freedom — irreconcilable / 我的自由与他者的自由之间——不可调和 |
| Love's Paradox / 爱的悖论 | Wanting the Other's freedom to freely choose me as its absolute value / 希望他者的自由自由地选择我作为其绝对价值 |
| The Body / 身体 | Both instrument of my transcendence and surface of my objectification / 既是我超越性的工具,又是我对象化的表面 |
English passages are paraphrased and quoted from Hazel E. Barnes' translation, "Being and Nothingness" (Philosophical Library, 1956; Washington Square Press, 1992). Chinese passages are paraphrased and quoted from the revised Chinese edition translated by Chen Xuanliang et al. (三联书店, 2007).
英文段落来自哈泽尔·巴恩斯翻译的《存在与虚无》(哲学图书馆1956年版;华盛顿广场出版社1992年版)。中文段落来自陈宣良等翻译的修订中文译本(三联书店2007年版)。